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INTRODUCTION 
How important is territoriality in explaining international conflict? In order to devise a 
theory of territoriality, the nature of territory’s impact on war must be explained. In other 
words political scientists should investigate what it is in territoriality that triggers 
interstate conflict, crisis and war. This article should be regarded as an effort toward the 
strengthening of such a theory, though its goals are very specific: to focus on several 
aspects of territoriality and establish their empirical links to violence in the protracted 
Arab-Israel conflict. 1 The study will examine three core questions. First, does the nature 
of a rivalry affect its attributes, namely, do the profiles of territorial and non-territorial 
crises differ? Second, does the location of states in a conflict situation affect their 
behavior, that is, do the profiles of crises with contiguous adversaries differ from those 
with non-contiguous actors? Third, does empirical data on international crises in a 
protracted conflict support central hypotheses from the territory-war literature? 
This study focuses on interstate rivalry. A rivalry “characterizes a competitive 
relationship between two actors over an issue that is of highest salience to them.”2 We 
will distinguish between rivalry over territorial issues and rivalries over other issues. The 
former include conflicts in which territory is the main issue of contention among 
adversaries, whereas the latter may contain a territorial element but it is not regarded as 
the core domain over which the adversaries confront one another. By introducing an 
issue-oriented typology of international crises, we highlight two major and at times 
overlapping issues: territoriality and ethnicity.3 But even within the salient issue in any 
given rivalry, states often fight over other stakes, since “the number of disputed 
questions, or stakes, that are seen as part of the same issue can vary.”4 Consequently, 
territoriality (or ethnicity) may therefore be an issue or a stake or both, manifesting itself 
in rivalry, crisis and war. 
In operational terms we will describe territoriality as one of the issues on which interstate 
rivalry manifests itself and also as a contiguity aspect that characterizes the location of 
the contending states. The former seeks to assess the impact of territoriality as an issue 
over which adversaries contend, whereas the latter views territorial location as a 
contextual element which affects conflict among nations. To examine both factors, the 
article will compare two pairs of crisis profiles: the first is type of rivalry: the centrality 
of territory as a core issue versus other non-territorial interstate conflicts; and the second 
is location of adversaries: identifying contiguous neighbors versus distant states in 
conflict.  
The dependent variable in this study will be violence, not war alone. The 25 crises of the 
Arab-Israel conflict identified by the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) project data set 
over the 1947-94 period, will be tested in order to examine the effects of territoriality on 
the level of interstate violence.5 Diversity in issues and location is expected to result in 
distinct levels of violence and to affect the termination of any particular crisis and the 
dynamics of the protracted conflict as a whole. 
TOWARD A TERRITORIAL EXPLANATION OF WAR 
In The War Puzzle, John Vasquez raises some of the most salient questions in the field of 
International Relations (IR). “Why does war occur? Why do some wars expand to 
encompass the entire system? Can more peaceful structures be built?”6 One of the core 
explanatory variables for the war puzzle is territoriality. Three theoretical approaches 
attempt to explain the relationship between territory and violence: proximity, interactions 
and territorial issues.7  Though all these approaches focus on aspects of territory, the 
reasoning they offer and the validity of their explanations differ.  
The proximity approach suggests that the relationship between contiguity and war is due 
to the proximity among adversaries.8 Distance usually places a restriction on the ability of 
most states to wage wars against states located far away.  Moreover, it is also likely that 
distant states will have little interaction and therefore no stakes to fight over. Two major 
restrictions exist with respect to this explanation.  First, proximity is a constant among 
states whereas war is not. Hence a logical flow arises: a constant cannot explain a 
variable - the changes that occur in world politics from peace to war and back to peace 
again must be affected by other factors, not contiguity alone.Second, the proximity 
explanation is closely related to the realist approach and seems almost a replica of the 
“power predicts behavior” theory. In effect, proximity may produce an opportunity for 
neighboring states to fight but it does not explain changes in motivation to do so.9 
Empirical evidence also sheds some doubt on this approach, since with the advance of 
technology, we should find that more distant states have the ability to wage wars, and 
therefore that the frequency of wars between non-contingent states should increase. Yet, 
in reality this is not the case.10
The interaction approach tries to strengthen the proximity explanation by introducing a 
substantive element that is subsumed in contiguity: friction between neighbors. 
Contiguous states fight not only because they are close and therefore able to do so, but 
because their location creates an increase in interactions among them, thereby raising the 
probability that state interests will conflict, leading to crisis and war. This input serves us 
well since it explains some instances where the location of states creates a struggle 
concerning topics regarded by all sides as worth getting involved in a confrontation over. 
However, a higher volume of interactions may lead to war or to peace. When departing 
from the realist assumptions of constant conflict and adopting the assertions of the liberal 
school, explanations that derive from the interaction approach result in a paradox: an 
increase in interactions could also mean more interdependence and thereby a more 
peaceful environment.11 When do realist or liberal assumptions hold? What explains a 
shift from intense conflict to regional cooperation? The interaction approach does not 
provide answers to these questions and therefore its value in explaining the dynamics of 
war and peace is somewhat limited. 
The territoriality approach focuses on territory as the most important   issue dividing rival 
states. Territorial issues create motivation for waging war. However, unlike research on 
proximity or interaction, advocates of territoriality emphasize the substance of 
contention: “what makes for war is that territory once seen as legitimately owned will   be 
defended by the use of violence where other issues are less likely to be.”12  Moreover, 
when defining a territorial issue, territoriality should not be viewed in a narrow sense:“it 
is not territoriality per se, but food and resources on the territory or the lack of them that 
may be the ultimate factor that makes territory so prone to violence.”13  
In a comprehensive study of territorial rivalries, Paul Huth defines a territorial dispute as, 
“either a disagreement between states over where their common homeland or colonial 
borders should be fixed, or, more fundamentally, the dispute entails one country 
contesting the right of another country even to exercise sovereignty over some or all of its 
homeland or colonial territory.”14   This definition sets forth a demarcation line between 
territorial rivalries and other  types of rivalry that include:  
commerce/navigation, protecting national/commercial interests, protecting religious 
confreres, protecting ethnic confreres, defending an ally, ideological liberation, 
government composition, enforcing treaty terms, and balance of power, among others . . 
..The presence of these non-territorial issues are important because they show that 
territoriality is not being so broadly defined so as to include every possible issue that 
might lead to war.15
While focusing on territorial issues, Vasquez also makes a clear distinction between 
issues and stakes and is aware of the diversity in stakes within a single issue. Moreover, 
he recognizes that territoriality may be a stake in a non-territorial issue:“a number of 
other issues appearing frequently as a source of war have a territorial dimension to them. 
These include such issues as: the creation (or unification) of a national state, maintaining 
the integrity of a state or empire, empire creation, state/regime survival, and dynastic 
rights/succession.”16   Similarly, in his study of 129 cases of territorial disputes over the 
1950-90 period, Huth also identifies several stakes that are part of the larger territorial 
issue. These include strategic location, support for minorities, political unification and 
economics.17   These stakes are the more specific and short range bones of contention 
over which states engulfed in territorial disputes confront one another. 
Though territoriality is a core issue explaining state resort to violence, it is not regarded 
as a deterministic factor, nor does it appear to be an automatic element that motivates 
nations to start a war. States are learning entities, they learn to fight wars but also to gain 
advantages from peace. Moreover, war often ends with a decisive allocation of resources 
among rivals thereby paving the road to coexistence and lower conflict. The merit of the 
territoriality explanation is in its ability to answer our queries over war but also over the 
puzzle oftransition to peace. Hence, it does not assume a constant situation of rivalry 
among neighbors. Nor does it necessarily adopt the realist assertions about the dominance 
of conflict interactions in interstate relations.Territorial issues, more than others over 
which states confront one another, are likely to lead to wars. But nations learn from wars 
and some wars lead to the resolution of territorial disputes. Unlike the two other 
explanations, the territorial approach accepts the fact that territorial differences can be 
solved, and therefore that states may reach peaceful periods in their relationships.  
Yet some gaps do appear in the territoriality approach. When rival approaches attempt to 
explain identical findings, more empirical testing is necessary, utilization of diverse 
sources is recommended and cross-validation of theory is required.However, additional 
empirical research cannot be a substitute for essential theoretical refinements.   These 
must provide us with suggestive clues on several topics.First, what is the impact of 
territorial issues and stakes on state behavior in crises?   Second, why do some wars lead 
to longer peaceful periods than others?And finally, if war is not a constant even among 
neighboring rivals, when and what type of territorial stakes can be solved without war? 
The present study suggests two new inputs to the theoretical debate.   First, rather than 
focus on rivalry and war, we will concentrate on international crisis. The outbreak of an 
international crisis will serve as an indicator of emerging and/or ongoing conflict over 
territorial and other issues, as well as of an incipient war.   If one attempts to understand 
how nations handle their territorial disputes, crisis is an essential tool since it highlights 
the escalation period that leads to war. Moreover, some crises do not lead to war, so 
research can probe the dynamics of war as well as its prevention.The analysis of 
territoriality as an issue in crises is based on an issue-oriented typology of international 
crises, on the identification of more specific stakes among rivals, as well as on the 
contiguity element between the contending adversaries. 
Second, all crises end, and the way they are resolved affects the extent of future interstate 
confrontation. We propose that the outcomes of crises can serve as a useful indicator to 
determine whether territorial and other issues   will be satisfactorily resolved or lead to 
further conflict.18
On the whole, there are two ways to treat the three territorial approaches to war: to focus 
on their diversity and to test their relative impact on the onset of crisis and violence, or to 
group them as one factor, territoriality. In this article I chose the former, so as to identify 
the specific contribution of the territorial element with its two operational variables: 
rivalry issues and location of adversaries. 
TERRITORIALITY AND INTERNATIONAL CRISES: 
CONCEPTS, TYPOLOGY AND VARIABLES  
At the core of this analysis is a distinction between territorial and non-territorial rivalries 
that express themselves in the form of international crises.   Such rivalries differ in the 
primary   issue over which the adversaries disagree. Recognizing this diversity, ICB 
distinguishes between two types of international crisis: those that focus primarily on a 
territorial issue and other crises in which the territorial issue is not the core issue. For the 
purpose of this study, we call the former territorial rivalries and the latter non-territorial. 
This classification is based on the identification of issues of contention between rivals.   
Only when the most salient issue is territorial will the crisis be classified as a territorial 
one.  
The analysis of territorial and non-territorial issues, which are stipulated herein to affect 
state behavior in crises, is based on an issue oriented typology of international crises. 
This typology integrates two leading International Relations research fields: territoriality 
and ethnicity. Though these two fields produced a wealth of findings they were not yet 
linked to one another.19 Combining these two prominent sources of conflict between 
states and other actors in world politics, yields a fivefold typology of international crises, 
consisting of three territorial type crises (categories 1-3 below), three ethnic type cases 
(categories 2-4) and one type (category 5) which does not belong to either group. Table 1 
below summarizes the five categories in this typology together with illustrations of crises 
that belong to each type of crisis. 
TABLE 1: An issue-oriented typology of international crises  
Type 1.   Territorial-interstate 
A crisis in which two or more states confront one another over territorial issues that are 
the most pronounced and long-term elements in conflict among them. For example, in the 
1973 October -Yom Kippur War, Egypt, Syria and Israel became engulfed in a full-scale 
war crisis over their territorial conflict which dated back to the Israeli conquest of Arab 
territories in the 1967 Six Day War. 
Type   2. Territorial-irredentist     
A crisis in which two or more states confront one another over a territorial issue that 
contains a significant ethnic dimension and that leads to a fundamental and long-term 
clash of interests among them.   It involves a claim by one state to a territory under the 
control of the other which is based on the existence of ethnic minorities residing in that 
territory. This category of cases does not apply to the Arab-Israel conflict at present, 
since a Palestinian state does not exist. However, its creation in the future may induce 
such a case when the newly established Palestinian state demands Israeli/Jordanian 
territory on the basis of the Palestinian population residing in those areas. Irredentist 
crises in other conflicts include the 1991 Gulf War, which commenced as a consequence 
of Saddam Hussein’s claim that Kuwait was an integral part of Iraq. Indeed, the swift 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was designed to satisfy this claim. Upon the entry of the US into 
the crisis realm, events rapidly escalated to more than just another regional irredentist 
confrontation between Iraq and Kuwait, as had been the case in 1961, illustrating the 
dangers of irredenta in world politics.  
Type   3. Territorial-secessionist  
A crisis similar to Type 2, except that it arises primarily on the basis that an ethnic 
minority in one state will demand to secede and join an ethnic majority in another state. 
As in Type 2, this category of cases could emerge in the future as a threat to both Israel 
and Jordan, where Palestinians reside and might demand to join a newly established 
Palestinian state. The 1938 Munich case, which followed the annexation of Austria by 
Germany, is an additional well-known secessionist case. The German-speaking areas of 
Czechoslovakia demanded to be part of Hitler’s Germany, thereby threatening the 
territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia.   During the September events, this threat 
materialized when Germany supported the Sudeten Germans’ demands for self-
determination. Unfortunately, Western appeasement policy in this secessionist crisis 
forced Czechoslovakia to comply with these territorial-ethnic demands and thereby pay 
the price Hitler requested. 
Type   4.  Ethnic non-territorial  
A crisis in which two or more states, as well as an ethnic actor,   confront one another 
over non-territorial issues. The ethnic-group   plays a central role in the confrontation in 
order to promote its non-territorial goals. 20  The 1976 Entebbe crisis falls in this 
category, as no territorial element was at the core of the confrontation between Israel, 
Uganda and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) Baader Meinhof 
hijackers, after the civilian Air France jetliner, en route from   Tel-Aviv to Paris,was 
forced to land in Uganda, and its Israeli-Jewish passengers were held hostage, subject to 
demands raised by the terrorists. 
Type   5.  Other - non-territorial and non-ethnic  
A crisis in which two or more states confront one another over non- territorial issues 
where no ethnic topic or actor is involved in their long-term clash of interests. The acute 
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis clearly represents this category as it did not contain territorial 
or ethnic elements. 
The importance of this issue-oriented typology of international crises is in the range of 
territorial and ethnic issues it introduces, differentiating between five types of crises. In 
crises which belong to types 2-4 an overlap occurs between territorial and ethnic 
elements, necessitating an in-depth analysis that would ascertain the respective effects 
and impact of each of these two elements. Cases in the territorial-interstate (type 1), 
ethnic-non-territorial (type 4), and other:non-territorial and non-ethnic (type 5) groups 
contain one of these elements alone and hence enable a more straight-forward analysis, in 
an attempt to analyze territoriality in crisis.    
In the empirical section of this study, this typology will be applied to the 25 crises ICB 
identifies in the Arab-Israel conflict. Among these, six cases belong to the first category 
of territorial-interstate (see table 3 below) and 19 cases are ethnic-non-territorial or 
other:  non-territorial andnon-ethnic in issue, termed in short, non-territorial cases (see 
table 4).   Hence, this article probes only cases with no overlap between territoriality and 
ethnicity.  
In sum, the study presents a theoretical framework and some preliminary findings which 
suggest that more cumulative studies should be directed to the links and spillover effects 
between territoriality and ethnicity in conflict, crisis and war. 
So far this article has focused on issues in crises. But states contend over stakes as well as 
over issues. Theoretically speaking, issues are not identical with stakes. Issues are 
broader in scope and endure longer,whereas stakes are more specific. Any issue may 
therefore encompass several stakes, some of which may gain prominence at certain times 
and others may fade, while the core issue endures. Following this theoretical distinction, 
territoriality may be an issue, or a stake, or both.   Often, as noted above, it appears as the 
most central issue in conflict, but it may also be a stake in a crisis, raised by one of the 
parties. A summary of issues and stakes in territorial and non-territorial rivalries is 
presented in Table 2 below. 
As noted in table 2, examining the manifestations of territoriality in crises reveals four 
possible combinations. Territorial type rivalries often involve territorial stakes, but need 
not be confined to these stakes. By contrast, non-territorial rivalries in which the 
dominant issue is not territory may include, at times, a territorial stake. 21  To illustrate the 
different types of territorial issues and stakes in crises we turn to the Arab-Israel conflict. 
First among them are cases with territoriality as an issue but not a stake.  Both the 1947 
Palestine partition-Israeli war of independence case, and the 1969 War of Attrition 
between Egypt and Israel, were territorial rivalry cases. In the former and first crisis in 
the Arab-Israel conflict, the UN proposal for theestablishment of two independent states - 
Jewish and Arab - triggered a prolonged crisis   in which five Arab states - Egypt,   Iraq, 
Jordan, Lebanon and Syria - resorted to violence in order to prevent the establishment of 
a Jewish state in what they considered to be Arab territory. In the 1969 case, Egypt 
initiated a war of attrition against the ongoing  Israeli occupation of the Sinai Peninsula, 
Egyptian territory that had been under Israeli control since the 1967 Six Day War.   
Although both crises involved territorial issues, they varied in their more immediate 
stakes, namely in the specific threats they embodied.In the 1947 case, a peak level threat 
to Israel’s existence was the core stake in dispute, while in 1969 the threat was more 
limited, focusing on war-related grave damage.  
Table 2: Issues and Stakes in Crises: 
Illustrations from the Arab-Israel protracted conflict  
Stakes 
Issues Territorial Stake  Non-territorial Stake  
Territorial 
Issue  
Territoriality as an issue 
& as a stake  
Hula drainage 
 
Territoriality as an issue 
only  
Existence: Palestine Partition 1947  
Grave damage: War of Attrition 
Non-Territorial 
Issue 
Territoriality as a stake only 
 
Litani operation 1978 
Territoriality as  
neither an issue nor a stake  
 
Existence: Iraq nuclear reactor 1980-81
Grave damage:Suez War 1956 
Turning to crises with territoriality as both an issue and a stake the relevant case is the 
1951 Hula Drainage crisis.The Israeli Land Development Company started drying 15,000 
acres of marshes, so that they could be used for agriculture.  This was the immediate 
stake that led to the confrontation. But the broader issue of contention touched upon the 
Demilitarized Zone, defined earlier in their 1949 Armistice Agreement, as well as the 
location of the future border between Israel and Syria.  
Not all the 25 Arab-Israel crises were straightforward territorial rivalries, because the 
core interstate issue in more than half of the cases was ethnic-non-territorial, involving a 
hostile spiral of Palestinian guerrilla and terror activity from the Arab states against Israel 
and Israeli reprisal acts designed to bring about an end to sub-state violence. style="mso-
spacerun: yes">  In these crises, the stakes among state adversaries were the stability of 
domestic Arab regimes who were faced with Israeli military retaliation raids, an interstate 
competition over spheres of influence defined by regional powers in the midst of the 
lengthy Lebanese civil war and at times even territory - as a stake in a dispute over a non-
territorial issue.    
More specifically, the 1978 Litani operation as well as the 1982 War in Lebanon are good 
examples for crises with territoriality as a stake but not as an issue. In the 1978 crisis, as 
a consequence of escalating PLO terror activity, the Israel Defense Force (IDF) invasion 
of Lebanon was geared to reduce the scope of Palestinian terror.   Though the prolonged 
presence of IDF troops in the area imposed a territorial threat to Lebanon, the major issue 
in this confrontation was that of PLO activity and its freedom of action within the 
sovereign Lebanese state.  
Similarly, in 1982, intensified PLO military activity drew Israel, Lebanon and Syria into 
a prolonged war-crisis.Immediately at stake during this crisis was the large-scale Israeli 
invasion of   Lebanese territory, though once again, the dominant issue was not territorial 
but rather a question of   Palestinian presence in the country. 
Turning to the last type, territoriality as neither a stake nor an issue, we find only a few 
crises, such as the 1956 Suez Canal nationalization war case and the 1981 Iraqi nuclear 
plant crisis, in which high-gravity threats of military-related grave damage and existence 
occurred even when the core issue among the adversaries was non-territorial. 
During the 1956 Suez case, Israel was concerned with the growing tide of Egyptian 
radicalism, and alarmed over the dangerous consequences of a shift in the regional 
balance of power in favor of Egypt. Israel was also preoccupied with Nasser’s continued 
support to Palestinian infiltrators who were a persistent menace at that time. However, no 
substantive territorial issue or stake was raised by any of the participating states from the 
region or from outside the Middle East.  
Similarly, during the 1981 Iraqi nuclear crisis, Israel initiated a surgical military attack 
against Osiraq, the Iraqi nuclear plant, in order to prevent Iraq from becoming a nuclear 
power in the region. Issues of Israeli existence and regional balance of power were 
pursued, but territorial elements were not present. 
In short, territoriality often manifests itself in crises as a core issue or as a major stake 
over which states contend.  This study asserts that territoriality has a profound impact on 
patterns of state behavior in conflict, crisis and war.  In order to identify profiles of 
territorial and non-territorial rivalry and to explore the links between territoriality and 
crises, this analysis focuses on four main crisis attributes using the ICB variables of 
trigger, gravity, violence and outcomes.  
The trigger of an international crisis is an event which sets forth a higher than normal 
escalation process between states. It denotes a change in behavior initiated by a state in 
one of the following domains: a violent act or a political, economic, non-violent or 
indirect violent act. Triggers may also involve an external change or an internal challenge 
to the regime of the adversary. In this study a distinction is made between two types of 
triggers:   violent ones and all other triggers that involve an increase in hostility without 
crossing the threshold of interstate violence. 
Gravity of threat represents the short-range stakes between adversaries in territorial and 
non-territorial rivalries. Grouping ICB values for threats in an international crisis into two 
categories of low and high stakes, this study identifies high stakes to involve territorial 
threats as well as those to military-related grave damage and existence. Low stakes 
involve economic threats, as well as threats of limited military damage, threats to 
influence and to the stability of the political system.  
Next, in this analysis the extent of violence used in an international crisis is examined. 
ICB identifies four levels of violence ranging from no violence at all, through minor and 
serious clashes to full-scale war. For the purpose of this study, the first two categories are 
considered as a low level of   violence while the latter two denote the high violence 
category. 
Turning to the mode in which crises end, the different forms of crisis termination 
identified by ICB are grouped here into accommodative and non-accommodative 
outcomes. The former include formal, semi-formal and tacit agreements while non-
accommodative termination takes the form of unilateral acts, imposed agreements and 
crises that fade with no agreed outcome. 
The basic assumption raised in the territoriality literature is that territorial disputes are 
significantly different from non-territorial ones and therefore the behavioral patterns of 
states in these two distinct types of rivalry will vary. In the following analysis a detailed 
description of behavior patterns will be presented with special attention paid to the role of 
violence, in an effort to answer one core question: to what extent do territorial and non-
territorial crises differ and in what aspects? 
TERRITORIALITY AND VIOLENCE IN THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT 
From its inception in 1947, the Arab-Israel conflict has been an existence conflict 
between neighboring states. An existence conflict is one “where the adversaries demand 
to be recognized as a distinct national entity and claim the same stretch of land as their 
sole territorial base.” 22   Hence, territoriality and ethnicity in this case were core elements 
in the conflict.Yet, different crises focused on specific issues and stakes. The analysis 
presented below presents trends over time and describes frequency distributions.   I am 
aware that the sample of cases is small but the findings should be taken, primarily, as 
illustrations of the usefulness of the theoretical framework in the exploration of complex 
conflicts over time. 
When a distinction is made between territorial and non-territorial rivalries which express 
themselves in the form of international crises, the distribution ofcases in both categories 
during the protracted Arab-Israel conflict is unequal: six territorial cases and 19 non-
territorial ones. ICB data on the attributes of crises in the Arab-Israel conflict are 
presented in Table 3 for territorial rivalry cases, and in Table 4 for  non-territorial 
rivalry.23 This protracted conflict, with its 25 international crises from 1947 to 1994 
identified by ICB,24 and the centrality of its violence which was present in all but four of 
the 25 crises, is regarded as a territorial confrontation among its principal adversaries. As 
such, it serves as a suitable microcosm for a close examination of a theory of 
territoriality, and as an interesting testing ground for exploring the links between 
territoriality, crisis and war.  The conflict dates back to the November 1947 UN General 
Assembly Resolution 181 that called for the partition of Palestine and the creation of two 
independent states, Jewish and Arab, one alongside the other.25   Although the core issue 
in the conflict was and remained territorial, specific crises, as noted earlier, have focused 
on various stakes: territorial, influence, military-related damage, economic topics as well 
as aspects of internal  stability and maintenance of the regime in power.   In its early 
years, peak gravity was evident because the Arab adversaries were not willing to accept 
the existence of a Jewish state in the region, let alone agree to its territorial boundaries.   
Hence, crises within the protracted conflict differ not only in their issues, thereby forming 
two types of   rivalry - territorial and non-territorial, but also in their stakes, that is in the 
specific threats that indicate the gravity of the various crises. While all territorial rivalry 
cases involve either existence, grave damage or territory with two crises (33.33 percent) 
for each of these stakes, in the non-territorial rivalry group the range of stakes is broader 
and the distribution within each stake varies: in six of these 19 cases, military-related 
grave damage is at stake (31.6 percent), in five of them influence (26.3 percent), in three 
political regime (15.8 percent), in two territorial aspects (10.5 percent) and existence, 
economic and limited military damage were evident in one case each (5.2 percent).26
Table 3: Territorial Rivalry Crises in the Arab-Israel conflict 1947-94  
Case Date Crisis Actors Trigger Gravity Violence Outcome 
Palestine  
partition 
Nov. 
1947 
Egypt Jordan
Iraq Israel 
Lebanon 
Syria 
External  
change Existence War 
Formal  
agreement 
Sinai 
incursion 
Dec.  
1948 
Egypt Israel
UK Violent Territory
Serious 
clashes 
Unilateral-Isreali 
compliance 
Hula  
Drainage 
Feb. 
1951 
Israel 
Syria 
Other: 
economic-
non-violent
Territory Seriousclashes 
Formal  
agreement 
Six-Day 
War 
May 
1967 
Egypt Israel
Jordan Syria
US USSR 
Non-violent 
military Existence War 
Imposed 
agreement 
War of  
Attrition 
March  
1969 
Egypt 
Israel 
USSR 
Violent Grave damage War Formal Agreement
Yom  
Kippur 
Oct. 
1973 
Egypt 
Israel 
Syria US 
USSR 
Non-violent
military 
Grave 
damage War 
Formal  
agreement 
Since the 1978 Camp David peace process and the Egypt-Israel peace treaty, efforts 
toward a peaceful resolution of this conflict have shown some results. The dynamics in 
the Arab-Israel conflict combine both war and peace extremes of interstate interactions. 
This is notable both inthe frequency of crises over time, and the intensity of conflict 
which shifted from more to less intense hostility. Changes in conflict patterns and trends 
toward accommodation are especially important, because a theory of war should be tested 
not only in a violent context but also in a peaceful environment.   The relative decline in 
outbreak of interstate crises since 1985, and the more striking reduction in levels of 
violence employed by the adversaries since 1973,provide us with insights on 
territoriality’s impact on world politics during more peaceful periods in the region.27
Table 4:Non-Territorial Rivalry Crises in the Arab-Israel conflict 1947 - 94  
Case Date Crisis Actors Trigger Gravity Violence Outcome 
Qibya Oct.1953 Jordan Violent Political regime 
Serious  
clashes 
Unilateral - 
Israel 
Gaza raid 
(ethnic) Feb.1955 
Egypt 
Israel Violent 
Political
regime 
Serious  
clashes Other - ally 
Suez War 
(other) July 1956 
Egypt 
France  
Israel UK 
US USSR 
Economic Grave damage War 
Unilateral -  
Israel 
compliance 
       
Qalqilya 
(ethnic) Sept. 1956 
Israel  
Jordan Violent Territory
Serious  
clashes Unilateral-ally
Rottem  
(other) Feb. 1960 
Egypt  
Israel 
Non-
violent 
military 
Influence None Tacit  agreement 
Jordan  
waters 
(other) 
Dec. 1963 
Egypt 
Israel  
Jordan 
Lebanon 
Syria 
Economic Economic None Unilateral - Israel 
El Samu 
(ethnic) Nov. 1963 
Israel  
Jordan Violent 
Grave 
damage 
Serious  
clashes 
Unilateral - 
Jordan 
Karameh  
(ethnic) 
March 
1968 
Israel  
Jordan Violent 
Grave 
damage 
Serious  
clashes 
Unilateral -  
Jordan 
Beirut 
airport 
(ethnic) 
Dec. 1968 Lebanon Violent Political regime 
Minor  
clashes Other - faded 
Libyan 
plane 
(ethnic) 
Feb. 1973 Israel External change 
Grave 
damage 
Serious  
clashes 
Unilateral - 
Israel 
Israel  
mobilization 
(other) 
April 
1973 Israel 
Non-
violent 
military 
Grave 
damage None 
Unilateral- 
Israel 
Entebbe 
raid 
(ethnic) 
June 1976 Israel Uganda 
Other- 
non-
violent 
Grave 
damage 
Minor 
clashes 
Unilateral-  
Israel 
Syria 
mobilization 
(ethnic) 
Nov. 1976 Israel 
Non-
violent 
military 
Influence None Tactic  agreement 
Litani  
operation 
(ethnic) 
March 
1978 Lebanon Violent Territory
Serious 
clashes 
Unilateral- 
Israel 
Iraq 
nuclear 
reactor 
(other) 
Jan. 1981 Iraq Israel 
Exteranl 
change Existence
Minor  
clashes 
Unilateral - 
Iraq 
Al-Biqa 
missiles I  
ethnic 
April 1981 Israel Syria Violent Influence
Minor 
clashes 
Formal 
agreement  
War in  
Lebanon 
(ethnic) 
June 1982 
Israel 
Lebanon 
Syria 
Violent Influence War Semi-formal agreement 
Al-Biqa 
missiles II Nov. 1985 
Israel 
Syria Violent Influence
Minor  
clashes 
Tacit 
agreement 
(ethnic) 
Operation  
Accountability 
(ethnic) 
July 1993 Israel Lebanon Violent 
Limited
military 
damage 
Minor 
clashes 
Tacit  
agreement 
Turning to the research questions presented in the first section of this study, we will now 
address two aspects of territoriality in crises, issues and location, in order to examine the 
effects of territoriality on basic crisis attributes: gravity of threat, onset of crisis, violence 
and outcomes. Diversity in crisis attributes will also enable us to explore some theoretical 
propositions on territory and war. 
TERRITORIALITY AND GRAVITY OF THREAT 
When stakes in crises are grouped into the two categories of low gravity (influence, 
political regime, economic and limited military damage) and high (existence, grave 
damage, territory), the profiles of territorial and non-territorial cases   differ. Table 5a 
presents data on stakes for these two groups of disputes.   Territorial disputes involve 
only high gravity stakes while the distribution of high and low stakes in non-territorial 
rivalries is almost equal, with 47.4 percent (n=9) and 52.6 percent (n=10) respectively.   
These findings, as will be illustrated below, are expected to result in distinct levels   of 
violence as a mode of resolving disputes in territorial and non-territorial conflicts. 
Table 5a: rivalry type and Gravity in the Arab-Israel conflict  
Rivalry type 
Gravity 
Territorial  
dispute 
Non-territorial
dispute 
High Gravity n=6 100.0% 
n=9 
47.4% 
Low Gravity n=0 0.0% 
n=10 
52.6% 
Findings on low and high stakes for contiguous and non-contiguous states are presented 
in Table 5b. At first glance these figures may seem surprising: common sense 
expectations lead one to stipulate high gravity in contiguous cases and lower gravity in 
non-contiguous ones, yet all eight non-contiguous cases involve high gravity, and while 
more crises between contiguous adversaries appear in the category of high stake cases - 
some 57 percent   (n=13) of the total number - 43 percent (n=10) involve low gravity 
issues. A possible explanation for this contradiction is an overlap between contiguous and 
non-contiguous cases in the Arab-Israel conflict. To illustrate:  the 1947 Palestine 
partition involved Israel and Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, all of which are 
contiguous states. However, Iraqi participation makes the crisis a non-contiguous case 
too. Similarly, in addition to the regional non-contiguous adversaries detailed in Tables 3 
and 4, major powers were also involved in theseconfrontations. This was the case with 
UK participation in the 1948 Sinai incursion; in the 1956 Suez war with France, UK, US 
and USSR as distant states; in the 1967 and 1973 wars with both superpowers 
participating in the crises; and in   the 1969 war of attrition where direct, though limited, 
Soviet military involvement was observed. High gravity, therefore, was not only the 
result of contiguity but also of a power gap that was introduced by the participation of  
major powers interacting in   regional events. The only purely regional non-contiguous 
cases were the 1976 Entebbe raid involving Israel and Uganda, and the 1981 Iraq nuclear 
reactor crisis, in which Israel and Iraq were the only participants. 
Table 5b: Location and Gravity in the Arab-Israel conflict  
Location 
Gravity 
Contiguous 
states 
Non-
contiguous 
states 
High 
Gravity 
n=13 
57.0% 
n=8 
100.0% 
Low Gravity n=10 43.0% 
n=0 
0.0% 
Data, noted below,also indicate that crises in the Arab-Israel conflict differ in their 
triggers, levels of violence and outcomes. This diversity is present when territorial and 
non-territorial cases are compared, but also when neighbors and distant adversaries are 
considered, though the diversity   in the former is greater than in the latter. It 
demonstrates, therefore, that issues are more meaningful than contiguity as far as thelinks 
between territoriality and state behavior in crisis are concerned. 
TERRITORIALITY AND CRISIS INITITATION 
Data in Table 6a, on rivalry and crisis onset, illustrate that non-territorial crises are more 
likely to erupt with a violent trigger than territorial cases:   while 57.9 percent (n=11) of 
the former begin with a violent act and 42.1 percent (n=8) have non-violent triggers, the 
distribution for the territorial rivalry cases reverses the trend - only 33.3 percent (n=2) 
start violently and 66.66 percent (n=4) are initiated by non-violent modes. These results 
indicate that states are more willing to resort to violence when handling non-territorial 
disputes and are more reluctant to do so in territorial conflicts, perhaps due, as will be 
seen below, to the greater risk in the latter cases of escalation to full-scale war. 
Table 6a: Rivalry type and Triggers in the Arab-Israel conflict  
Rivalry type 
Trigger 
Territorial 
dispute 
Non-
territorial 
dispute 
Violent 
Trigger 
n=2 
33.3% 
n=11 
57.89% 
Non-violent n=4 n=8 
trigger 66.66% 42.11% 
Turning to location and triggers, Table 6b shows that contiguous states account for 57 
percent (n=13) of the violent trigger cases and 43 percent (n=10) of non-violent ones, 
whereas in non-contiguous cases the gap between violent and non-violent triggers is 
much greater - 25 percent (n=2) and 75 percent (n=6) respectively. This means that, 
while states may be cautious with resort to violence in territorial disputes, contiguity still 
increases the prospect of the onset of violence. 
Table 6b: Location and Triggers in the Arab-Israel conflict  
Location 
triggers 
Contiguous 
states 
Non-
Contiguous 
states 
Violent 
Trigger 
n=13 
57.0% 
n=2 
25.0% 
Non-violent 
trigger 
n=10 
43.0% 
n=6 
75.0% 
TERRITORIALITY AND VIOLENCE 
As noted in Table 7a, all six territorial rivalry cases escalated to serious clashes/war, 
though only two of these cases erupted with a violent trigger.By contrast, the 19 non-
territorial cases vary almost equally in their severity of violence: 52.63 percent (n=10) of 
these cases involved no violence or escalated only   to minor clashes, while 47.37 percent 
(n=9) of them manifested serious clashes and war.   
Table 7a: Rivalry type and Violence in the Arab-Israel conflict  
Rivalry type 
Violence 
Territorial 
dispute 
Non-
territorial 
dispute 
No-low 
violence 
n=0 
0.0% 
n=10 
52.63% 
Serious 
clashes - 
war 
n=6 
100% 
n=9 
47.37% 
Contiguity, as noted in Table 7b, leads to higher levels of violence, with 35 percent (n=8) 
of these cases involving no/low violence and 65 percent (n=15) with serious clashes/war. 
However, when non-contiguous states are involved in crises, the reverse is true, 75 
percent (n=6) of the cases  involved no/low violence, and only 25 percent (n=2) 
developed to severe violence including war.  
Table 7b: Location and Violence in the Arab-Israel conflict  
Location 
Violence 
Contiguous 
states 
Non-
contiguous 
states 
No-low 
violence 
n=8 
35.0% 
n=6 
75.0% 
Serious 
clashes - 
war 
n=15 
65.0% 
n=2 
25.0% 
When we evaluate violence, both as triggers and as a process of crisis escalation, it is 
clear that contiguity adds to the level of hostility, while territorial issues have a 
moderating effect on the onset of crises, but not on violent crisis escalation. Together, 
contiguity and territoriality add to thefrequency and severity of international crises in the 
Arab-Israel conflict. How can the recent processes of conflict resolution be reconciled 
with these findings? Both theory and findings provide an answer; territoriality explains 
not only war but also peace. War is a process by which a decisive mode of resource 
allocation is reached, and depending upon its termination, peaceful periods may exist 
between neighbors. An examination of crisis outcomes is essential in order to understand 
the shift from conflict to cooperation in the Middle East.    
TERRITORIALITY AND OUTCOMES 
Tables 3 and 4 present data on the termination of crises. For the purpose of comparative 
analysis I have grouped these specific outcomes into two categories. The first, termed 
accommodative, involves formal and semi-formal agreements and tacit understandings. 
These are modes where the results of crisis confrontation and war are translated into 
political understandings between the contending parties, thereby adding to regional 
stability and increasing the prospects of conflict resolution. The second, called non-
accommodative, includes unilateral acts that terminate crises, and imposed agreements. 
In such cases, no rules or regulations appear at the end of the confrontation. Hence, 
conflict is likely to escalate once again between adversaries at a later time. Moreover, in 
the case of an imposed agreement, grievances may even lead to greater regional 
turmoil.28 This was the case with the 1967 Six Day War, which ended with a UN 
ceasefire imposed   on the Arab states and Israel by the superpowers. Arab dissatisfaction 
with the 1967 debacle triggered their surprise attack against Israel which started the 1973 
war. The October war was designed to enhance Arab dignity and to reactivate diplomatic 
processes that would bring an end to Israeli occupation of formerly Arab territories.  
Data in Table 8a point to a clear conclusion: territorial cases are terminated by 
accommodative modes while the reverse is true for non-territorial crises. More 
specifically, 66.66 percent (n=4) of the territorial crises led to formal agreements, and 
only 33.33 percent (n=2) resulted in non-accommodative outcomes. The former include 
the 1948 Israeli War of Independence, the 1951 Hula Drainage crisis, as well as the 1969-
70 War of Attrition and the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The exceptions to this rule are the 
1948 Sinai incursion and the 1967 Six Day War. 
By contrast, more often than not non-territorial disputes end in a non-accommodative 
manner; 68.42 percent (n=13) of the cases ended this way, while only 31.58 percent 
(n=6) concluded with an understanding between adversaries.All but one of these non-
territorial crises where accommodative outcomes were reached involved   a competition 
of influence (1960 Rottem, 1976 Syria Mobilization, 1981 Al-Biqa I, 1982 War in 
Lebanon and 1985 Al Biqa II). Although the 1993 Operation Accountability case was 
geared to prevent military hostilities in northern Israel and was not directly a struggle of 
influence between Israel and Syria, it too followed the same pattern and ened with a tacit 
agreement. 
Table 8a: Rivalry type and Outcomes in the Arab-Israel conflict  
Rivalry type 
outcome 
Territorial 
dispute 
Non-
territorial 
dispute 
Accommodative 
outcome 
n=4 
66.66% 
n=6 
31.58% 
Non-
accommodative  
outcome 
n=2 
33.33% 
n=13 
68.42% 
Table 8b indicates that contiguity does not have much impact on the modes of crisis 
termination in the Arab-Israel conflict.  Contiguous and distant states end more of their 
confrontations with non-accommodative than accommodative outcomes, and rather 
similar percentages are found in the distribution of cases: 60 percent in the former and 40 
percent in the latter. 
Table 8b: Location and Outcomes in the Arab-Israel conflict  
Location 
Outcome 
Contiguous 
states 
Non-
Contiguous
states 
Accomodative  
outcome 
n=10 
43.0% 
n=3 
37.5% 
Non-
accommodative 
outcome 
n=13 
57.0% 
n=5 
62.5% 
In sum, this protracted conflict emerged from an existential-territorial rivalry between the 
Arab-Palestinian side and Israel. The high frequency of crises and war in the past half 
century supports the assertions of all three approaches on the link between territoriality 
and war. The proximity explanation sheds light on the primary rivals involved in crises: it 
highlights the fact that the actors located closest to Israel, the core of this territorial 
rivalry, are the most likely to participate in hostile confrontations. For these states, 
territory serves as an issue of contention because the boundary between them was never 
demarcated, let alone agreed upon.  
The interaction approach provides us with insights on the links between interstate and 
sub-state confrontations. Since the major rivals are contiguous neighbors, and the 
territorial dispute was left unresolved, friction developed easily on territorial as well as on 
other stakes. Territorial rivalry led most frequently to war as in the 1947 Partition case 
and the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Other spheres of turmoil developed over economic 
issues, as was evident in the 1963-64 Jordan Waters case which was triggered by Israel’s 
insistence that the implementation of its national water carrier project would commence 
in spite of Arab opposition. Influence was at stake too, mainly because Israel and Syria 
were involved in the prolonged Lebanese civil war and hostilities were often the result of 
respective claims that influence zones were not adhered to by the adversary. The 1976 
Syria mobilization case, as well as the later cases of Al Biqa I in 1981 and Al Biqa II in 
1985, illustrate such events. Contiguity led often to escalation when a dyadic 
confrontation on a specific topic, such as the PLO’s presence in Lebanon and the 1982 
Lebanon War case, developed into a multiple actor crisis involving clashes between the 
Israeli army and Syrian forces in the Biqavalley. Furthermore, in 11 of the 25 cases, 
interstate hostilities were a consequence of non-state actors - Arab Fedayeen groups in 
the fifties, PLO organizations   from the late sixties to the late eighties and fundamentalist 
Islamic organizations since then. These actors operated with various degrees of freedom 
in Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon, building their infrastructure in these Arab states, 
infiltrating their personnel into Israel and carrying out acts of sabotage. Jerusalem’s 
response was consistent: Arab regimes that permitted such organizations to maintain a 
presence on their soilwere responsible for the outcomes and were therefore subjected to 
harsh Israeli reprisals. In short, proximity led to sub-state penetration and to violent 
interstate behavior. 
The territoriality approach is supported by findings on the frequency of war and on the 
links between crisis outcome and conflict resolution. It was these interstate confrontations 
on territorial issues that escalated to peak-level violence, and that since the 1979 Camp 
David process have led to a slowly evolving peace process in the Middle East. 
TOWARD A THEORY OF TERRITORIALITY AND WAR 
When elaborating on his assertionthat territoriality isthe most important driving force to 
war among rivals, Vasquez set forth two basic propositions and spelled out five 
hypotheses on war being affected by the issues in conflict among adversaries and by the 
extent of contiguity among them. 29 Huth spelled out other propositions focusing on 
territorial issues, the diverse stakes within these confrontations, as well as on their 
domestic and international contexts.30 I am proposing a “Modified Realist Model” on the 
basis of these hypotheses and am testing for territorial rivalries in the years 1950-90.  
Empirical support presented by Vasquez31 and Huth32 point to the salience of the 
territorial element in explaining interstate confrontation and violence. The present article 
attempts to further the goals of knowledge accumulation and theory construction by 
examining these propositions and hypotheses with ICB data.33 Data on dyadic and multi-
state crises in the Arab-Israel conflict are presented in Table 9a and 9b. 
Table 9a: Territoriality and High Violence in the Arab-Israel conflict  
Rivalry 
type 
Location 
Territorial  
dispute 
Non-territorial 
dispute 
Contiguous  
States 
1947 - 
Palestine 
partition 
(multi-state) 
1948 - Sinai 
incursion 
(multi - 
state) 
1951 - Hula 
Drainage 
(dyadic) 
1967 - Six - 
Day War 
(multi-state) 
1969-War of 
Attrition 
(multi-state) 
1973 - Yom 
Kippur War 
(multi-state) 
1953-
Qibya(dyadic)
1955 - Gaza 
raid (dyadic) 
1956 - Suez 
War 
(multi - state) 
1956 - Qalqilya 
(dyadic) 
1963 - El Samu 
(dyadic) 
1968 - Karameh
(dyadic) 
1973 - Libyan 
plane 
(dyadic) 
1978 - Litani 
operation 
(dyadic) 
1982 - War in 
Lebanon  
(multi-state) 
Non-
contiguous 
states 
1947 - 
Palestine 
partition 
(multi-state) 
1948 - Sinai 
incursion 
(multi-state) 
1967 - Six 
Day War 
(multi-state) 
1969 - War 
of Attrition 
(multi-state) 
1956 - Suez 
War (multi-
state) 
1973 - Yom 
Kippur War 
(multi-state) 
Table 9b: Territoriality and No / Low Violence in the arab-Israel conflict  
Rivalry 
type 
Location 
Territorial 
dispute 
Non-territorial  
dispute 
Contiguous  
States   
1960 - Rotem - 
(dyadic) 
1963 - Jordan 
waters 
(multi-state) 
1968 - Beirut 
airport (dyadic)
1973 - Israel 
mobilization 
(dyadic) 
1976 - Syrian 
mobilization 
(dyadic) 
1981 - Al-Biqa I 
(dyadic) 
1985 - Al Biqa II 
(dyadic) 
1993 - Operation 
Accountability 
dyadic 
Non-
contiguous 
states 
  
1976 - Entebbe 
raid (dyadic) 
1981 - Iraq 
nuclear reactor 
(dyadic) 
Proposition 1: “Rivals that have territorial disputes are more apt to go to war directly 
with each other at some point in their history than those without territorial disputes. 
Hence, rivals that do not go to war should be those without territorial disputes.”34
This proposition was derived from the territoriality approach which deals with the 
substantive aspects of territory and  focused on the effects of territorial issues on violence 
in state behavior. I applied it in the present study to violence in crisis onset and to war as 
a mode of conflict resolution. Findings on territorial and non-territorial rivalries 
supported this proposition, on escalation to war but not on the use of violence in the onset 
of crisis. When crisis triggers were observed,territorial rivalries in this protracted conflict 
tended to be less prone than non-territorial ones to violent onset, thereby pointing tothe 
conclusion that territorial issues do not affect high levels of violence at the start of an 
international crisis.  
Yet during the course of the crisis, the use of violence in territorial rivalries gained 
prominence and thus territorial rivalries were twice as likely as non-territorial ones to 
involve war, thereby supporting proposition 1 for violence that occurs during the crisis. 
Proposition 2: “Rivals that go to war in the absence of territorial disputes should be 
involved in more multilateral wars than dyadic wars. Likewise, rivals that go to war in 
the absence of territorial disputes should be more likely to get involved in ongoing wars 
than at the beginning of wars.”35
This proposition was also derived from the territorial issues approach as it spelled out the 
relationship between non-territorial issues and war. It was applied to crises in the Arab-
Israel conflict, for which the distinctions of dyadic interactions and wars had been 
specified. Data on territorial/non-territorial disputes and the types of violence they 
involve were presented in Tables 8a and 8b. Of the nine non-territorial rivalries seven 
cases were dyadic: 1953 Qibya, 1955 Gaza raid, 1956 Qalqilya, 1963 El Samu, 1968 
Karameh, 1973 Libyan plane and 1978 Litani operation.In all these cases the level of 
violence was serious clashes short of full-scale war. Two cases were multi-state wars, and 
in both, violence reached its peak level involving six actors in the 1956 Suez War,  and 
three in the 1982 war in Lebanon.  The absence of dyadic war and the presence of two 
multi-state wars support both claims in proposition 2.  Non-territorial rivals tended to get 
involved in multi-state war rather than in dyadic war, and they tended to join the war in 
different stages.   Such was the case with France and the UK, who entered the 1956 war 
two days before the Israeli invasion of Sinai, and with Syria whose forces became 
involved with the advancing Israeli army in the Biqa valley, two days after the Israeli 
thrust into Lebanon began in 5 June 1982. 
All five hypotheses specified below were derived from the contiguity approach and spell 
out expectations on the  relationships between contiguity and war. 
Hypothesis 1: “Rival dyads that are contiguous are more apt to go to war at some point 
in their history than rival dyads that are not contiguous.”36
This hypothesis indicates the effects of location on war proneness between dyad 
rivals.Data in Table 6b reveal that 65 percent (n=15) of the contiguous cases involved 
serious clashes and war while only 25 percent (n=2) of the non-contiguous cases did so. 
When the distinction between dyadic and multi-state dyads was introduced, we found 
only two cases of non-contiguous dyads: the 1976 Entebbe raid, and the 1981 Iraq 
nuclear reactor attack. The first involved serious violence short of war, and the latter 
involved minor clashes. Hence, in the Arab-Israel conflict, non-contiguous dyad rivals 
did not go to war, and high levels of multi-state violence also tended to exclude non-
contiguous states. 
Hypothesis 2: “Rivalries involving contiguous states are more apt to end in dyadic war 
than rivalries involving noncontiguous states.”37
This hypothesis involves all rivalries between contiguous and non-contiguous states but 
relates specifically to dyadic war while the earlier one deals with dyadic pairs and war in 
general.As presented in Tables 11a and 11b and noted in hypothesis 1 above, of the 23 
contiguous cases, 35 percent (n=8) involved no-low violence and 65 percent (n=15) 
involved serious clashes-war. Within the latter category, six cases involved (multi-state) 
full-scale war: 1947 Palestine partition, 1956 Sinai, 1967 Six Day War, 1969 War of 
Attrition, October 1973-Yom Kippur war and 1982 War in Lebanon.   Since all wars in 
the Arab-Israel conflict are multi-state wars, we were unable to apply this hypothesis but 
its counterpart on contiguity and multi-state war was examined in Hypothesis 3. 
Hypothesis 3: “Noncontiguous rivals that go to war are more apt to be involved in 
multilateral wars than contiguous rivals that go to war.”38
This hypothesis probes the relationship between contiguous and non-contiguous rivals 
and multi-state war. Among the six multi-state wars in the Arab-Israel conflict, all were 
between contiguous rivals and only   two included non-contiguous states: 1947 Palestine 
partition-Israel war of Independence and 1956 Suez-Sinai war. Hence, findings did not 
support hypothesis 3.   All multi-state wars in the Arab-Israel conflict took place between 
neighbors whereas only rarely did distant states participate in these wars. These findings 
may be a specific attribute of regional wars and should be compared, in future research, 
with empirical evidence on other regions and on global wars.  
Hypothesis 4:“Noncontiguous rivals that go to war are much more apt to join an 
ongoing war than contiguous dyads that go to war.”39
This hypothesis deals with the timing in which rivals go to war. The two cases in which 
non-contiguous states participated in a regional war did not support this hypothesissince 
in both cases the distant state did not join an ongoing war but initiated it: in the 1947 
Palestine partition crisis,Iraq together with other Arab states invaded Israel after its 
declaration of independence, thereby starting the Israeli War of Independence.   In 1956, 
military operations began with a joint Anglo-French invasion ofthe canal zone in 
response to Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez canal, and Israel joined the war two days 
later. However, due to the small number of war cases with non-contiguous rivals, more 
comparative research on regional and global wars must take place before any conclusions 
can be reached. 
Hypothesis 5:“In comparison to contiguous rivals, noncontiguous rivals will either have 
no war or be involved only in multilateral wars with rivals.”40
This hypothesis is a closederivative of hypothesis 3 which investigated the links between 
contiguity and multi-state war. This hypothesis is not supported by findings since only   
75 percent (n=6) of the non-contiguous cases did not involve serious clashes or war, but 
in 25 percent (n=2) full-scale war cases was evident, and in four additional cases (50 
percent) some violence occurred. Correspondingly,   such was the case with respect to the 
distribution of contiguous cases: 35 percent (n=8) of them   escalated to full-scale war 
and in 17 percent (n=4) of them no violence occurred. 
On the whole, this analysis of rivalry and location profiles, as well as the use of data on 
state behavior in crises to explore some leading hypotheses on the war-proneness of 
neighbors fighting over territorial issues point to a similar conclusion: the territoriality 
approach which focuses on issues provides better explanations than the contiguity 
approach which highlights the location aspect. 
CONCLUSIONS:  
UNDERSTANDING WAR AND PEACE IN INTERSTATE CRISES 
The goals of this article were to analyze territorial issues, stakes and the location of 
adversaries in crises and to establish their empirical links with state behavior: initiating 
crisis, resort to violence in coping with crisis, and modes of crisis termination. Findings 
on 25 crises that were part of the Arab-Israel protracted conflict served as our empirical 
field for exploring three core questions: first, does the type of rivalry affect its attributes? 
Second, does the location of states affect their behavior? Third, does empirical data on 
international crises and regional protracted conflicts support central hypotheses from the 
territory-war literature?  A summary of findings on territoriality and attributes of crises in 
the Arab-Israel conflict is presented in Table 10. 
Table 10: Territoriality and Contiguity: 
Theoretical expectations and findings  
Territoriality variable 
Crisis behavior 
Conclusions from 
findings on: 
Territorial rivalry      
Contiguous states 
Theoretical Implications 
Violent Initiation rejected                         supported 
Findings accord more 
with contiguity than  
with territoriality 
High gravity supported                        rejected 
Findings accord more 
with territoiality 
than with contiguity 
Severe violence supported                         supported 
Findings accord with 
borth territoriality and 
contiguity: converge in 
their imapact of 
escalating interstate 
violence in crisis 
Accommodative  supported                   Findings accord more 
termination    not supported with  
territoriality than with 
contiguity 
Most of the findings on state behavior in crises supported the assertions on territoriality 
and violence. Yet territoriality as an issue over which adversaries fight rather than merely 
territorial contiguity provided us with stronger links to their patterns of initiating and 
coping with crises. More specifically, the profiles of rivalry show distinct attributes for 
territorial and non-territorial rivalries, though not for all variables analyzed in this study. 
The same is true for profiles of location, with respect to neighbors and distant 
adversaries. 
Initiation of international crisis, the first step in the escalation ladder between states was 
better explained by the contiguity factor than by issues. Data on crises that took place in 
the Arab-Israel conflict did not support the stipulated link between territorial rivalry and 
violent initiation. By contrast, territorial rivalry cases were initiated with less violence 
than their non-territorial counterparts. This pattern runs counter to the expectation that 
states will easily resort to violence when they seek to promote their territorial issues.  
However, the location of adversaries did sustain theoretical expectations. Overall, 
neighbors were prone to much more violence in initiating crises than distant states.  
Viewed together, it appears that the puzzle of violence in crisis initiation was only partly 
explained by territory. Since most crises do not erupt with full-scale war, and crisis 
management can at times prevent escalation to violence, more theoretical as well as 
empirical effort should be devoted to this domain in order to establish clearer 
conclusions.   
Gravity of threat denoting the stakes in crises was associated, as expected, with 
territoriality. Both territorial issues and location provide support for such links, though 
issues rendered a better explanation. High gravity stakes were more frequent in territorial 
rivalry cases than in non-territorial rivalries. This may be the result of the protracted 
territorial conflict that acted as a catalyst and therefore increased the gravity of any 
particular confrontation, which was not regarded by its participants as a separate crisis 
but rather as part of the ongoing rivalry. 
Gravity was also associated with location. Yet in the Arab-Israel protracted conflict, it 
was the cases with non-contiguous states that entailed higher gravity.   The reason for this 
pattern in the Middle East was that most non-contiguous cases involved superpowers and 
therefore the stakes were higher in these crises than in others where only regional 
adversaries were present.Distance also implied a power gap in favor of a superpower and 
dangers of escalation to global confrontation. Closer observation of the contiguity factor 
in regional and global crises is necessary in order to ascertain that   the contiguity element 
alone and not the power dimension affects the gravity of stakes. 
Violence in crises, the core aspect associated thus far with state hostility and violence,was 
supported by both the issue and location elements, thereby strengthening the assertions of 
both the territoriality and the contiguity approaches. Hence, territoriality as a substantive 
issue together with the location aspect characterizing the adversaries led to a converging 
force of higher interstate violence.  
If territorial issues increased the motivation of states to use violence, location acted as a 
further element prompting such use. Proximity gave rise to the issue over which the 
adversaries confronted one another, but it also made the option of war possible for most 
rivals. While only very powerful states could afford to fight a distant enemy, most 
neighbors could confront one another with some chance of victory.  
These results lead to a clear conclusion: the combination of a protracted territorial 
conflict, territorial issues in crises, and proximity among contending parties, is a formula 
for violent confrontations designed to reach a decisive allocation of the disputed 
territorial issues. But this inclination to violence and war has some positive element built 
into it,  through its effects on crisis termination and future conflict between rivals, as 
illustrated by findings on the termination of crises.  
Outcomes, too, like violence, were linked to territory,  though territorial issues provided a 
better explanation than contiguity did. Territorial rivalries, more than others, were likely 
to end with formal, semi-formal or tacit understandings. By contrast, location did not 
yield support for the expected links between proximity and accommodative termination. 
In the Arab-Israel conflict minor differences were found in modes of crises termination 
when contiguous and non-contiguous states were compared.   The reason for this pattern 
of outcomes may derive from the fact that in the Middle East, superpowers as distant 
states acted not only as crisis escalators but also as managers, thereby leading to near 
equal prospects of resolution in contiguous cases with regional actors alone and in non-
contiguous ones, i.e. those where powers from outside the region were involved. 
The findings - that neighbors as well as distant states involved in a protracted conflict, 
end their crises in an accommodative way - raise the prospect that some of the issues they 
confront could be resolved and lead to a more stable relationship between them in the 
future. These results are especially important given our earlier findings on the resolution 
of territorial issues versus non-territorial ones.   The former were solved by an 
accommodative agreement in two thirds of the cases, the latter in only one third of them. 
Territoriality, in both of its aspects - issues and location - escalates interstate 
confrontations but also has a moderating effect on outcomes. Therefore, it is a central 
factor in explaining both war and peace between states.  
A full theory of territoriality should explain war as well as peace and elaborate on how 
and when change occurs from war to peace.  Probing the link between territory and 
outcomes is one step in that direction. Obviously, a full theory of war and peace cannot 
be reached by a single explanatory variable, even one as powerful as territoriality. Future 
research will have to integrate the territoriality factor into a more encompassing model 
that will provide answers to these and other topics still left unexplained. The five fold 
issue-oriented typology introduced in this study suggests that multiple  overlapping 
effects exist between two core fields in international relations research: territoriality and 
ethnicity. Hence, not all cases of territorial confrontations are free of ethnic elements, and 
not all ethnic struggles are devoid of territorial elements.  Recognizing that such an 
overlap exists, more attention and research efforts should be devoted to a systematic 
comparison between these five types in order to discern the particular attributes of each 
group and the specific contributions of territoriality and other issues to state behavior in 
crisis. More area and issue specific comparative analysis of protracted conflicts and 
enduring rivalries is also needed in order to enhance our understandings of territoriality, 
war and peace in world politics. 
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